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NOTE AND COMMENT

WHAT Szavwc GMvgs JURIsDIcTIoN IN PsoN.-On March 6th, 1917, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of McDonald v. Mabee,
reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, in i75 S. W. 676, held
that a judgment in foreclosure proceedings in which the defendant was
served only by publication did not merge the cause of action so as to bar
a suit on the original notes for the balance unpaid by the sale of the mortgaged property on the foreclosure, although the statute of the state declared
such service sufficient to give jurisdiction in personam, and the defendant
was a citizen of the state and bound by the law so far as it was constitutional.
The only case in the United States squarely sustaining the Texas decision
on similar facts, so far as the writer is aware, is the often cited case of
Henderson v. Staniford (i87o), xo5 Mass. 504, 7 Am. Rep. 551, in which it
was held that action on the original cause was barred by the plaintiff recovering a judgment in a suit in California, where the parties resided, and
in which the defendant was served only by publication. The court said
that if the service so made was defective the defendant could waive the
defect, and did so by urging the judgment as a defence. It is no doubt
true that a defendant can waive service by appearing in the suit, as is
done every day; but this defendant did and proposed no such thing; and
no appearance by him even if made could cure the defect unless such appearance were entered before judgment, so as to confer jurisdiction on
the court to render the judgment. That a judgment recovered by such
service was no bar, and was not available as a defence against a new action
on the original cause, had, at the time this decision was rendered, been
held in other states. Whittier v. Wendell (i834), 7 N. H. 257; Middlesex
Bank v. Butman (1848), 29 Me. i9. Thus considered, the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in McDonald v. Mabee would seem
to affirm a doctrine sufficiently clear on principle to require neither proof
nor precedent to support it, were it not for the decisions to the contrary cited.But these decisions are not so contrary as they 8eem; fdt: they wete rendered
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on the assumption that such a service gives jurisdiction, and it is in that
regard that the present case is of the greatest interest.
The notion has persisted in many quarters that statutes may enable
courts to acquire jurisdiction to give judgments in personam against persons who have neither appeared nor been served with personal notice within
the jurisdiction to appear and defend, whereby to put them in default.
There are the cases of Lucas v. Wilson (z88z), 67 Ga. 356, and Hulbert v.
Thomas (1887), 55 Conn. 18x, xo Ati. 556, 3 Am. St. Rep. 43, in which
judgments rendered on such service were affirmed in the Supreme Court
because the requirements of the statute had been complied with, no inquiry
being raised as to whether or not the statutes were constitutional. Then
there are such cases as Nelson v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. (i9o7), 225 Ill.
197, 8o N. F_ xog, in which it was held that judgment against a corporation
on such service was good because such was the service provide4 by the
statute, and the defendant by citizenship is bound by the laws of the state.
The facts are that the defendant was an Illinois corporation, agreeing to be
bound by such service by copsenting to be a corporation under that law,
and therefore bound by the agreed method of service. The same would be
true if it were a foreign corporation and accepted the .permission given by
the state to do business in the state on condition of consenting to accept
service of that sort. The same would be true of a natural person who gives
a judgment note,. providing that if not paid when due the payee may appoint
an agent to appear and confess judgment against the maker to the amount
of the note, interest, and costs. Such a judgment is valid, not because the
legislature could legalize such a method of service, but because the party
has expressly agreed to be bound by such service. It has been suggested
that the same logic applies to natural persons, that by consenting to be
citizens of the state they agree..to be bound by its laws; but that is not
true, they are citizens whether they will or no. We were not consulted as
to whom we would -hoose for parents or where we preferred to be born,
assuming that we could have made a legal choice at that time. Even Mr.
Justice Field's concession in Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. 714, 735, that
a statute of a state providing that non-residents doing a partnership business
in the state should be bound by indirect service, has since been repudiated,
because such legislation denies equal protection of the law. Flexner v. Parson (1915), 268 Ill. 435, 1i9 N. E. 327.
In the English courts it is quite clearly established that legislation providing for less than personal notice to confer jurisdiction in personam is
valid, and will be given effect. Thus there is the leading case of Douglas v.
Forrest (1824), 4 Bing. (x3 E. C. L.) 686, an action on a Scotch judgment
against a Scotchman, in which it was held that a service consisting only of
calling him in open court, at separate terms, to appear and calling in public
in the market-square of Edinburgh and *at the sea-shore after he had gone
to India, was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render judgment
against him in personam which would sustain an action of debt in England,
because the service was according to the law of Scotland, to which the de-
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fendant owed allegiance. Again, in Bocquet v. MacCarthy (1831), 2 Barn. &
Ad. (22 X_ C. L.) 951, it was held that a statute of a British colony providing that in all actions against an absent party process might be served by
delivering the same to the king's attorney, without requiring him to forward
it to the party, was not so repugnant to the principles of natural justice as
to prevent the English court maintaining an action of debt on a judgment
rendered by a court of the colony against a citizen of the colony on such
a service. The same has been held in an Irish court of a French judgment
of France: Maubourquet v. Wyse (1867), 1 Ir. Rep. C. L. 471.
But the writer has always maintained that these decisions do not express the accepted law of the United States, and that here no state can
confer on its courts jurisdiction to render judgments in personam on any
less service than personal service on the party to be charged, and that
within the confines of the state. This view is supported by the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States, first in the case of Webster v. Reid
(i85o, ii How. (52 U. S.) 437, in which plaintiff claimed title to land
by sale under execution on a judgment recovered for service of the commissioners appointed to partition the half-breed Indian lands, Inooo acres.
The commissioners not being paid for their services sued "The Owners of
the Half-Breed Indian Lands," had process served by publication according
to the law of the territory, took judgment for the amount of their services,
had execution levied on all the lands, had them sold, and Reid claimed title
by virtue of such sale. The court held the judgment and sale void, and
Mr. Justice McLean in giving the opinion of the court said: "These suits
were not a proceeding in rem against the land, but were in personam against
the owners of it. Whether thcy all resided within the territory or not does
not appear, nor is it a matter of any importance. No person is required to
answer in a suit on whom process has not been served, or whose property
has not been attached. In this case there was no personal notice, nor an
attachment or other proceeding against the land until after the judgments.
The judgments, therefore, are mere nullities and did not authorize the
executions on which the land was sold." The observation that the rule is
the same as to citizens and non-residents is worthy of particular note; and
the same sentiment was emphatically repeated by Mr. Justice Field in Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S.714. But because the defendant in that case
happened to be a .non-resident, .many persons have said the decision might
have been different had the defendant been a citizen of the state, basing
their opinions on the English decisions above referred to, and the notion
that the state may provide some substitute for personal service in the case
of its own citizens. This qualification has been most explicitely denied in
the Supreme Court of California in DeLaMontanya v. DeLaMontanya (I896),
X12 Cal. xox, 44 Pac. 345, 53 Am. St. I65, 32 L. R. A. 82, holding void a
decree for alimony and custody of children against a citizen of the state
on service by publication according to the requirements of a statute declaring
that such service should be sufficient to give jurisdiction in personam; and
similar rulings have been made in other states: Rahar v. Rahar (1911), I5O
Iowa 511, 129 N. W. 494, Ann. Cas. x912D, 68o; Moss v. Fitch (19o8), 212
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Mo. 484, i1 S. W. 475, 126 Am. St. 568. In Smith v. Grady (887),
Wis. 215, 31 N. W. 477, it was held that ajudgment against a citizen of
Ontario rendered on service on the debtor personally in the state of Wisconsin, in compliance with the laws of Ontario was not entitled to respect
sufficient to prove a claim against the estate of the defendant therein in the
probate courts of Wisconsin. In Grubel v. Nassauer (913), 21o N. Y. 149,
1o3 N. E. 113, it was held that an action was not maintainable on a judgment rendered by a court of the German Empire against a citizen of Germany
on service according to the law of that country, after he had sailed to
America
Wilson v. Seligman (1892), 144 U. S. 45, 12 Sup. Ct. 54x, after return of
execution unsatisfied against a corporation, an order was made on motion, according
to the provisions of the statute of the state, that execution issue against the
stockholders, including defendant as one, and notice of this motion was personally
served on him outside of the state; he did not appear, and on default an order
was made findihg him to be a stockholder and liable for the judgment, and awarding
execution against him. The statute required "sufficient notice in writing to the
On this order action was brought against the
persons sought to be charged."
defendant in this case, and judgment for defendant was affirmed on writ of
error to the Supreme Court of the United States. GRAY, J., * * * "In the case
at bar the defendant never resided in Missouri, and was not served with process
within the state, either upon the original writ against the corporation or upon the
motion for execution against him. He- denies that he was a stockholder; and
the question whether he was one was not tried or decided in the controversy
between the plaintiff and the corporation, nor involved in the judgment recovered
by one of those parties against the.other. Under the statute of Missouri, and upon
fuitdamental principles of jurisprudence, 'he is entitled to legal notice and trial
of the issue before he can be charged with personal liability."
Amsbaugh v. Exchange Bank of Maquoketa (x885), 33 Kan. x0o, 5 Pac. 384,
was an action on two judgments rendered against defendant in the circuit court
of Jackson County, Iowa, on process served there on defendant's wife at the
house where he had resided, a week after his departure with intent never to return.
He left November 4, and the processes were served November 12 and 14 following.
Judgment for plaintiff reversed on error, because judgments were void. The
any
court held that a judgment rendered on such service was not entitled to
respect in any other state even if the service was according to the law of the
state where it was rendered; because defendant had abandoned his residence
before process was served, and~therefore was beyond the jurisdiction.
St. S68, was a
Ross v. Fitch (1908), 2a Mo. 484, 111 S. W. 47S, x26 Am.
served only
decree for divorce, alimony, and custody of children, on process
state; and
on defendant personally in another state, according to the law of' this
clear
sale of land on execution thereon. The divorce purchaser at the sale sued to
of giving the
the title. GRAVEs, J. "To our mind the legislature had no intent
was simply
service in section 592 a broader scope than that of publication, but
some kind
providing another method of accomplishing the same thing; i. e., giving
or
of a notice that the court had seized the res, whether that res was property
of the parties
the marriage status, and would proceed to determine the rights
We repeat that, whatever may be the holdings elsewhere,
in and to the res.- 0
judgment
our court placed the acquisition of jtzrisdiction upon which a personal
in
can be rendered upon the fact of personal service of the party with process
this state and
this state. In other words, no process issued by the courts of
personal judgserved upon the party defendant in another state can be the basis of a
state or of
ment. And this is true whether the party in fact is a citizen of this
allotheft Itat "

I In
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In rendering the opinion in the case of McDonald v. Mabee, Mr. Justice
HoLmis makes a concession not heretofore admitted by the Supreme Court
of the United States, that something a little short of personal service might
constitute due process of law, within the protection of he constitution. This
concession may be due to the fact that there are to be found on the statute
books of nearly all the states provision for service of process by leaving a
copy at the residence of the defendant with some member of the, family
of suitable age and discretion. Mr. Justice HoLu.s says: "Perhaps in
view of his technical position and the actual presence of his family in the
state a summons left at his last and usual place of abode would have been
enough. * * * It is going to the extreme to hold such power gained by
service at the last and usual place of abode." "The writer is not aware of
any case in which the constitutionality of a statute providing for acquisition
J.R. R.
of jurisdiction by such mode of service has yet been sustained.
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